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NOTES AND COMMENT
for a conspiracy to charge a person falsely with an offense, and
procure his arrest therefor, is good, although the indictment alleges
that the conspiracy was executed. 14 Section 37 of the Federal Criminal Code makes conspiracy a felony, and as crimes of equal degree
do not merge, the question of merger does not arise in that jurisdiction.
The court points out, in the instant case, that to uphold the
doctrine of merger would be to give the defendant, and not the
prosecuting attorney, the right to determine the crime with which
he must be charged. It is often possible to convict for the lesser
crime when it would be impossible to convict for the greater. The
court remarked: 15
"The same act may involve different offenses, felonies
and misdemeanors. Robbery includes larceny, and if one
breaks and enters a dwelling with intent to steal and does
so, there is committed both burglary and larceny. It would
be unfortunate if the state could not prosecute for any one
of the crimes committed, without regard to the question of
whether a lesser crime had merged in the greater."
This appears to deal the death-blow to the doctrine of merger
in this state, and every student of the law will agree that it is a
step in the right direction.
DANIEL O'SULLIVAN.

CERTIORARI TO REVIEW

DECISIONS OF THE BOARD OF STANDARDS

AND APPEALS.

By section 1283 of the Civil Practice Act, the writ of certiorari
is abolished except for the purpose of reviewing tax assessments.
The statute 1 provides that in all cases, except the latter, a petitioner
must proceed by order and not by writ. The courts have declared
that section 1283, et seq., of the Act apply with equal force to
certiorariproceedings to review decisions of the Board of Standards
and Appeals 2
"Johnson v. State, 26 N. J. L. 313 (1857).
5Supra note 1 at 91, 177 N. E. at 319.
'N. Y. C. P. A. §1283, Am'd by L. 1922, c. 355: "Nothing in this section
shall be construed as abolishing the writ of certiorari under the tax law, or
under any other general or special statute, to review assessments for purposes
of taxation which are placed on the local tax rolls."
' Matter of Multiplex Garages, Inc. v. Walsh, 213 App. Div. 155, 210 N. Y.
Supp. 178 (1st Dept. 1925), rev'd, on another ground, 241 N. Y. 527, 150 N. E.
540 (1925) ; Matter of McGarry v. Walsh, 213 App. Div. 289, 210 N. Y. Supp.
286 (2d Dept. 1925).
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In the recent case of People ex rel. St. Albans-Springfield Corporation v. Connell,3 however, the Court of Appeals has held that
section 719a of the Greater New York Charter 4 has modified the
rules of certiorariin so far as they apply to the review of decisions
of the Board of Standards and Appeals. Although in form the
method is still by order of certiorari,in effect it is similar to the
manner of reviewing tax assessments. 5
The facts were as follows: Pursuant to the Building Zone
Resolutions adopted by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment,
the relator's 1 property was placed in a business district. Unable
to profitably dispose of the property either for residential or business
purposes, he applied to the Board of Standards and Appeals to
permit the erection upon the corner lot of a gasoline station. This
was in accordance with section 21 of the Amended Building Zone
Resolutions of the City of New York which permits the Board of
Standards and Appeals to vary any provision of the zoning requirements where practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships intervene.
The application before the Board was denied, however, whereupon the relator obtained an order of certiorarito review the decision pursuant to section 719a of the charter. 7 The Special Term
made an order referring the matter to a referee to take proof of all
the practical difficulties in the way of carrying out the strict letter
of the Zoning Resolutions. The referee found the evidence to be
overwhelmingly in favor of the relator. The property in question
was almost valueless as an ordinary business property. Stores nearby were vacant and the banks refused to loan money on the property in this neighborhood. The referee further found that the only
profitable use to which the property could be put was a gasoline
station. The Special Term confirmed the referee's report, and directed the Board of Standards and Appeals to permit the relator to
erect upon his property the gasoline station as requested. The Board
appealed from this order claiming: (1) The Board of Standards
and Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying the relator's
application; and (2) on the application for certiorari the Special
-257 N. Y. 73, 177 N. E. 313 (1931).
'Subd. 4, §719a, Greater New York Charter (Laws of 1901, c. 466, Am'd
Laws of 1917, c. 601). "If, upon the hearing, it shall appear to the court that
testimony is necessary for the proper disposition of the matter, it may take
evidence or appoint a referee to take such evidence as it may direct and report
the same to the court with his findings of fact and conclusions of law, which
shall constitute a part of the proceedings upon which the determination of the
court shall be made. The court may reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or
may modify the decision brought up for review."
Supra note 3.
In this note the respondent is referred to as the relator, since the case
bears the legend People ex rel. St. Albans, etc. In Multiplex Garages, Inc. v.
Walsh, referred to in note 2, supra, the Appellate Division said that such a
proceeding should be entitled "In the Matter of the Application of" the
petitioner.
7Supra note 4.
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Term was without power to direct the referee to take evidence
de novo.
The Court of Appeals affirmed and modified the judgment of
the Special Term. It said that the evidence was so overwhelmingly
in favor of the relator's contention that the refusal of the Board
to grant the relief requested amounted to a positive abuse of discretion. Moreover, said the court, under subdivision 4 of section
719a of the New York Charter, the Special Term had the power
to direct the referee to take evidence de novo.
On the question of zoning, the above holding falls in line with
a long series of cases where the courts have refused to set aside
the decision of the members of the Board of Standards and Appeals
unless their findings were obviously unsupported by the evidence
adduced before them." Thus, in Falvo v. Kerner,9 the court said
that the mere fact that more profit may be derived from certain
property in a district zoned as residential if a gasoline station is
erected upon the property, instead of using it for residential purposes, is not a sufficient basis for the claim of the property owner
that to refuse his application for the erection of a station thereon
is an unnecessary hardship on him. In Wetner v. Walsh,' ° the court
declared the existence of a presumption in favor of the correctness
of the determination arrived at by the Board of Appeals, and in
Revorg Realty Co. v. Walsh,"x the court said that inasmuch as there
was no convincing proof that it was impossible to use the property
for any other purpose than a gasoline station, the respondent had
not shown practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships to exempt
it from the general rule.
On the question of introducing new evidence at a certiorari
proceeding, however, the St. Albans case is seemingly in conflict
with the dicta in a previously decided case which was affirmed,.by
*the Court of Appeals without opinion. The case adverted to is en' Falvo v. Kerner, 222 App. Div. 289, 225 N. Y. Supp. (4th Dept. 1927) ;
Matter of Goldenberg v. Walsh, 215 App. Div. 396, 213 N. Y. Supp. 578 (1st
Dept. 1926), rev'd, 242 N. Y. 576, 152 N. E. 434 (1926) ; People ex rel. Facey
v. Leo, 230 N. Y. 602, 130 N. E. 910 (1921); People ex rel. Sheldon v. Board
of Appeals, 234 N. Y. 484, 138 N. E. 416 (1923); People ex rel. Smith v.
Walsh, 211 App. Div. 205, 207 N. Y. Supp. 324 (2d Dept. 1925), aff'd, 240
N. Y. 606, 148 N. E. 724 (1925); Matter of Sagamore Road Corp. v. Lee, 224
App. Div. 744, 230 N. Y. Supp. 58 (2d Dept. 1928) ; aff'd, 250 N. Y. 532, 166
N. E. 313 (1928); Matter of Revorg Realty Co. v. Walsh, 225 App. Div. 774,
232 N. Y. Supp. 141 (2d Dept. 1928), aff'd, 251 N. Y. 516, 168 N. E. 410
(1929); Matter of Wilkins v. Walsh, 225 App. Div. 774 (2d Dept. 1928), affd,
251 N. Y. 518, 168 N. E. 411 (1929); Matter of Beardsley Realty Co. v.
Walsh, 225 App. Div. 815 (2d Dept. 1929), affd, 252 N. Y. 571, 170 N. E.
147 (1929).
'Supra note 8.
10212 App. Div. 635, 209 N. Y. Supp. 454 (1st Dept. 1925), aft'd, 240 N. Y.

689, 148 N. E. 760 (1925).
1 Supra note 8.
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titled People ex rel. Helvetia Realty Co. v. Leo.12 In that case, the
Appellate Division said that on certiorarito review the determination of the Board of Standards and Appeals, the court cannot hear
the matter de novn, its jurisdiction being limited to matters affecting
the board's jurisdiction under section 719i, subdivision 4 of the
Charter. The question to be decided, said the court, was only
whether the Board abused its discretion in relation to the evidence
before it. This decision induced a learned commentator to say:
"That the court is not at liberty to consider facts de hors
the return and that the facts set forth therein must be accepted
as true seems to be the accepted doctrine in New York and
elsewhere." 13
In the St. Albans case, however, the Court of Appeals said
that its affirmance of the Helvetia 14 case without opinion was without express approval of the statement barring new evidence on the
hearing.' 5 The court distinguishes the Helvetia case, declaring that
the power of review given to the courts was not directly involved as
it might have been if the application for a variance had been denied
and the owner's rights thereby restricted. In the Helvetia case, the
Board of Standards and Appeals had permitted a variance which was
approved by the Special Term and on appeal.
Thus, under the interpretation of section 719a, subdivision 4,
of the Greater New York Charter in the St. Albans case, the rule
in New York now is that on a hearing for certiorari to review a
determination of the Board of Standards and Appeals, the court is
given express power to review the determination of the Board of
Appeals and to reverse or to affirm wholly or partly, or to modify
the decision brought 16up for review, and may take additional evidence on the hearing.
"195 App. Div. 887, 185 N. Y. Supp. 949 (1st Dept. 1921), aff'd, 231
N. Y. 619, 132 N. E. 912 (1921).
'Weisman, Zoning Administration in New York City (1928) 2 ST. JOHN's
L. REv. 105, at 166.
" Supra note 12.
'a Cf. contrary dicta in Werner v. Walsh, supra note 10.
" Cf. this procedure with that of the writ of certiorari to review tax
assessments. People ex rel. Manhattan Railway Co. v. Barker, 152 N. Y. 417,
46 N. E. 875 (1897). In this case the Court said (p. 431) : "The petition is
regarded as the complaint, the return as the answer, and, in deciding the issues
joined thereby, the court may call witnesses to its aid and their testimony
becomes a part of the proceedings upon which the determination of the court
is to be made. That determination is a revaluation and it may be a different
valuation of the property assessed."
Parson, discussing the writ of certiorariunder the tax law says: "In the
tax law the certiorari proceedings might well be an action, as it is a proceeding
to review de novo and not a review as is contemplated in the code proceeding."
PARSON, PRACTICE MANUAL (Standard ed. 1931) 380.

NOTES AND COMMENT
In accordance with this rule, the order of the court below,
which authorized the erection of a gasoline station, was affirmed as
modified by a direction that when the circumstances become so
changed by the development of the city that the property is reasonably susceptible of being applied to business uses, then, upon the
application of the authorities or anyone interested, the gasoline station must be removed.
Discussing the constitutionality of zoning laws, the court said:
"Law is applied to facts, and as the facts change in the
process of time the law adapts itself accordingly. That
which may be unconstitutional today may be legal years
hence * * *." 17
This language, noble though it be, was mere dicta since the constitutionality 18 of zoning restrictions was not in issue in this case.
Whether it is evidence of a growing tendency for the formulation of
a realist jurisprudence 19 remains to be seen. Meanwhile, pity the
fact that such words are only dicta instead of forming a part
of a decision upholding the constitutionality of some great social
enactment.
ALBERT SCHLEFER.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF DAMAGES FOR FRIGHT
IN NEW YORK.

The question as to whether damages are recoverable for fright
and for nervous shock has been the subject of legal controversy
since 1888 when the Court in Victorian Railways Cofnfnrs. v.
Coultas I decided that there could be no recovery for damages resulting from fright. Before many years had passed the doctrine of

that case was practically overruled, 2 and in 1925 the case of Ham-

brook v. Stokes Bros. Ltd.3 liberally extended the doctrine of recovery of damages for fright as it then existed in England.

" Supra note 3 at 82, 177 N. E. at 315.
"3For a discussion of the constitutionality of zoning laws, see Weisman,
Zoning Administration i New York City, supra note 13.
"Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence (1931) 44 HARv. L.
REv. 697.
1 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888).
2
Dilieu v. White, 2 K. B. 669 (1901).
1 K. B. 141 (1925). The plaintiff was allowed to recover for the death
of his wife brought about by reason of the severe shock she suffered in witnessing the defendant's motor lorry negligently strike her daughter. It was
said plaintiff could recover, although his wife had not been shocked by a fear
of injury to herself, provided shock resulted from what she saw or realized,
rather than that which someone told her.

